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"It goes without saying that a court can and should always refrain from
deciding a particular issue before there is any necessity therefor, 19 and that
it is the court's function to establish in the case before it not only the existence of the proceedural and substantive prerequisites of justiciability, but also
the existence on the record of sufficient facts to pass upon the issue and make
the decision res judicata in the case. If there are insufficient facts, the judgment may be withheld as in effect an advisory opinion or involving a moot
case, and on actions for declaratory judgments courts have, as a rule, been
opinions, or decide abstract or hypoalert and astute not to render advisory
'20
thetical questions or moot cases."
Another development of litigation under the declaratory judgment statutes
has been that such a judgment is usually denied where a specific statutory
remedy for a special type of case has been provided. 21 However, as Professor Bochard again so aptly points out,22 the occasional suggestion in
Pennsylvania, 23 Hawaii, 24 Michigan,2 5 and elsewhere 20 that a declaratory
judgment will not be rendered merely because another common remedy is
available is an error of law and a flat contradiction of the express words of
which says, "whether or not further relief is or could be
the -statute,
27
claimed."
R. S. O.
Injunction-Legality of Picketing-Constitutional Law-Defendants, as
representatives of a restaurant employees union, undertook to organize an
employees restaurant union in Hammond and asked plaintiffs to sign a contract whereby they would agree to employ only union members at terms set
out in the contract. The plaintiffs refusing to sign such a contract, a strike
was called and two of the plaintiffs' employees left their employment. Plaintiffs' place of business was picketed by members of the union who carried
placards upon which in large letters were the words, "THIS RESTAURANT
IS UNFAIR TO UNION LABOR." As a result, the plaintiffs lost the
patronage of many customers, and drivers of trucks who delivered supplies
to the restaurant refused to deal with the restaurant while the picketing was
in progress. Held, the picketing, if conducted lawfully, without intimidation, !or violence, fraud or misrepresentation, will not be enjoined even if
there is a loss of patronage and consequent pecuniary damage.'
All jurisdictions agree that picketing for an illegal purpose will be enjoined
as a tort if resulting in irreparable injury. Picketing, therefore, will always
be enjoined when in furtherance of an illegal strike, or when it induces an
19 Citing, People v. Smith (1912), 206 N. Y. 231, 99 N. E. 568; McCabe v. Voorhis
(1926), 243 N. Y. 401, 153 N. E. 849.
20 Citing, Crawford v. Favour (1928), 34 Ariz. 13, 267 Pac. 412; Hayden Plan Co. v.
Wood (1929), 97 Cal. App. 1, 275 Pac. 248; City of Manpato v. Jewell County Comm.
(1928), 125 Kan. 674, 266"Pac. 96; Garden City News v. Hurst (1929), 129 Kan. 365,
282 Pac. 270; Axton v. Goodman (1924), 205 Ky. 382, 265 S. W. 806; In Re City of
Pittsburgh's Consol. City Charter (1929), 297 Pa. 502, 147 Atl. 525; Perry v. City of
Elizabethton (1930), 160 Tenn. 102, 22 S.W. (2d) 359.
21 Hoel v. Kansas City (1930), 131 Kan. 290, p291 Pac. 780; Moore v. Louisville
Hydro-Electric Co. (1928), 226 Ky. 20, 10 S. W. (2d) 466; Oldhan County ex. rel.
Woolridge v. Arvin (1932), 244 Ky. 551, 51 S. W. (2d) 657; Haan v. Haan (1928),
133 Misc. Rep. 197, 231 N. Y. S.58.
22 Bochard, Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act (1934), 18 Minn. L. Rev. 241.
23 Nesbitt v. Manufacturers' Casualty Ins. Co. (1933), 310 Pa. St. 374, 165 Atl. 403.
24 Kaleikau v. Hall (1923), 27 Hawaii 420.
25 Miller v. Siden (1932), 259 Mich. 19, 242 N. W. 823.
26 Lisbon Village Dist. v. Town of Lisbon (1931), 85 N. H. 173, 155 Atl. 252;
Green v. Inter-Ocean Casualty Ins. Co. (1932), 203 N. C. 767, 167 S. E. 38; Schmidt v.
La Salle Fire Ins. Co. (1932), 209 Wis. 576, 245 N. W. 702.
27 Burns' Ann. Ind. Stat. (Supl. 1929), sec. 680.1.
1 Scofes v. Helmar (1933), 187 N. E. 662.
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unjustifiable breach of contract.2 However, if the contract is one providing
for employment at will, peaceful picketing will be allowed even if it results
in the termination of the employment. 3 It is not necessary that the employer
be injured by the breach of the contract for a term. An employee may sue4
to enjoin the picketing which might cause the employer to cancel his contract.
As to when a strike is legal or when it is illegal, the cases are in great conflict.5 However, assuming that the strike is legal, the question remains, what
means may be used to enforce it?
There is a split of authority upon the question as to the legality of peaceful
picketing. In Beck v. Railway Teamsters' Union 6 the court held that the
plaintiffs were entitled to an injunction to restrain the distribution of boycotting circulars, and to restrain the pickets from intercepting the plaintiff's customers even though such was done peaceably and away from the plaintiff's
premises. The court said that the strikers could present their cause to the
public in newspapers or circulars in a peaceable way, but that there must be
no attempt at "coercion". In State v. Stewart, 7 it was held that a combination of persons for the purpose of deterring a corporation from taking into
its employ other person is an unlawful control over the use and employment
by workmen of their labor for such time, person, and price as they chose.
These cases proceed on the theory that picketing in any form is unlawful,
and that there can be no such thing as peaceful picketing. In Rosenberg v.
Retail Clerks Association, 8 it was said, "Picketing by strikers in its very
nature tends to, and does accomplish its object by the illegitimate means of
physical intimidation and fear, and will be enjoined." Barnes v. Chicago
Typographical Union9 said explicitly the very fact that the defendants established a picket line about the plaintiff's premises, irrespective of whether
physical violence was resorted to, was in itself an act of intimidation and
unwarrantable interference with the plaintiff's rights. 10 However, the cases
referred to do not represent the majority view on this question.
The majority view is set out in Stillwell Theatre Corporation v. Kaplin,"
where it was decided that peaceful picketing.of a moving picture theatre with
a sign truthfully stating that the owners refused to employ members of a
certain union, will not be enjoined in an action by the owners because its
effect may be to coerce them by diminution of their patronage to violate a
contract which they have made with another union to employ its members
12
only during a stated period. Gevas v. Greek Restaurant Workers Club,'
does not seem to take either the majority or minority position and cites cases
2 Rice

Machine Co. v. Fales Machine Co. (1922), 242 Mass. 566, 136 N. E. 629;

Kitchen and Co. v. Local Union No. 141, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers et al (1922), 91 W. Va. 65, 112 S. E. 198; Hitchman Coal Co. v. Mitchell (1917),

245 U. S. 229, 62 L ed. 260; Cook v. Wilson (1919), 108 Misc. 438, 178 N. Y. S. 463.
3

La France Electrical Construction Co. v. International Brotherhood of Electrical

Workers Local No. 8 (1923), 108 Ohio 61, 140 N. E. 899.
4 Parker Paint Co. v. Local Union No. 813 (1921), 87 W. Va. 631, 105 S. E. 911.

GPlant v. Woods (1900), 176 Mass. 492, 57 N. E. 1011; Picket v. Walsh (1906),

192 Mass. 572, 78 N. E. 753; 45 Harv. L. R. 1226; Also Cook, The Privilege of Labor
Unions in the Struggle for Life (1918), 27 Yale L J. 779; 39 Yale L. J. 914; 20 Harv.
L. R. 243.
6 Beck v. Railway Teamsters Union et al (1898), 118 Mich. 497, 77 N. W. 13.
7 State v. Stewart (1887), 59 Vt. 273, 9 Atl. 559.
8 Rosenberg v. Retail Clerks Association (1918), 39 Cal. App. 67, 177 Pac. 864.

9 Barnes v. Chicago Typographical Union (1908), 232 Ill. 424, 83 N. E. 940.
10 Moore v. Cooks, Waiters etc. Union No. 402 (1919), 39 Cal. App. 538, 179 Pac.

417; Knudsen v. Benn (1903), 123 Fed. 636; Local Union H. R. E. I. A. v. Slathakis
(1918), 135 Ark. 86, 205 S. W. 450; George Jonas Glass Co. v. Glass Bottle Blowers
Association (1907), 72 N. J. Eq. 653, 66 A. 953.
11 Stillwell Theatre Inc. v. Kaplan (1932), 295 N. Y. 405, 182 N. E. 63.
12 Gevas v. Greek Restaurant Workers Club (1926), 99 N. J. Eq. 770, 134 A. 309.
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on both sides of the question. In Exchange Bakery and Restaurant Inc. v.
Rifkin, 13 the court said, "Picketing connotes no evil. It may be accompanied,
however, by violence, trespass, threats, or intimidation, express or implied.
There may be no threats, no statements, oral or written, false in fact, yet
tending to injure plaintiff's business." This case represents the majority
view. 14 The rule in states holding that peaceful picketing is lawful is that
such is true only where there is no statute or ordinance to the contrary. The
constitutionality of such ordinances has been upheld. 15 This result is reached
on the theory that it is not an unreasonable exercise of the power to preserve
peace and good order to prevent that which so often disturbs the peace and
destroys good order. The ordinance, however, must be reasonable. Thus in
Hall v. Johnson, 16 the court held that an ordinance prohibiting picketing and
declaring picketing to be prima facie evidence of a conspiracy to injure an
employer's trade, was void. In Indiana, an ordinance prohibiting picketing
was upheld in Thomas v. City of Indianapolis. 17 In Watters v. City of
Indianapolis,' 8 an ordinance prohibiting any display of banners except in
procession was upheld in applying the ordinance to one picketing the shop.
As to whether peaceful picketing is lawful in the absence of a statute in
Indiana, the case of Karges Furniture Co. v. Amalgamated Woodworkers'
Local Union No. 131,19 definitely commits Indiana to the majority view. The
court there held that even if fourteen of the six hundred members of the
union did disregard the express instructions and declared policy of the union
to conduct strikes peacefully, and used force and intimidation, that fact alone
was not sufficient in itself to condemn the union as a body. The court went
on to say that whether picketing is lawful or unlawful depends in each particular case upon the conduct of the pickets themselves, and that workmen
when free from contractual obligations may, to accomplish a legitimate purpose, use all lawful and peaceful means to induce others to quit or refuse
employment. In Thomas v. City of Indianapolis, 20 the court although upholding an ordinance prohibiting picketing, cited the Karges case and stated
that peaceful picketing is lawful, in the absence of any statute or ordinance.
In the principal case, therefore, the court in refusing to allow an injunction
against the carrying on of peaceful picketing, followed the weight of authority
and the Indiana rule as set out in the Karges case.
Which rule as to the legality of peaceful picketing is the most desirable?
In Harper of Torts, sec. 333, it is said, "so long as the economic order is
grounded upon a premise of strife between the producer and consumer, between labor and capital, the battle should not be rendered one sided by perpetuating the advantage which society, combined in the guise of capital enjoys
as a result of an accidental oversupply of labor when the power to influence
public opinion is denied workmen." To deny the laborer the right to picket
13 Exchange Bakery and Restaurant Inc. v. Rifkin (1927), 245 N. Y. 260, 137
N. E. 130.
14 American Steel and Wire Co. v. Wire Drawers and Die Makers Union No. 1 and
3 (1898), 90 Fed. 608; Southern Ry. Co. v. Machinests Local Union No. 14 (1901),
111 Fed. 49; Iron Moulders Union v. Allis-Chalmers Co. (1908), 166 Fed. 405; Truax
v. Cooks and Waiters Union (1918), 19 Ariz. 379, 171 Pac. 121; Sherry v. Perkins
(1888), 147 Mass. 212, 17 N. E. 307; Iverson v. Dilno (1911), 44 Mont. 270, 119 Pac.
719.
15 Ex Parte Stout (1917), 82 Tex. Crim. Rep. 183, 198 S.W. 967; State v. Personett
(1923), 114 Kan. 680, 220 Pac. 520; Hardie Tynes Mfg. Co. v. Cruse (1914), 189
Ala. 66, 66 So. 657; Re Williams (1910), 158 Cal. 550, 111 Pac. 1035.
16 Hall v. Johnson (1917), 87 Ore. 221, 169 Pac. 515.
17 Thomas v. City of Indianapolis (1924), 195 Ind. 440, 145 N. E. 550.
IsWatters v. City of Indianapolis (1922), 191 Ind. 671, 134 N. E. 482.
19 Karges Furniture Co. v. Amalgamated Woodworkers Local Union No. 131 (1905),
65 Ind. 421, 75 N. E. 877.
20 Thomas v. City of Indianapolis (1924), 195 Ind. 440, 145 N. E. 550.
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would be to deny him an opportunity "to appeal to the public sense of social
justice." To deny the right of picketing would be to nullify to a large extent
the effect of the strike. The right to strike is recognized as a method of
industrial warfare. 21 In view of this, and since picketing is necessary to preserve the right to strike, the majority and Indiana view is clearly the enlightened and most socially desirable rule.
The plaintiffs' contention that the picketing deprived them of property
without due process of law and was therefore a violation of the 14th Amendment, clearly cannot be sustained. The due process clause 22applies only as
against acts of the state and not against acts of individuals.
M. K.
BOOK REVIEWS
The Indiana Law of Future Interests, Descent and Wills. By Bernard C.
Gavit. (1934. The Principia Press, Inc., Bloomington, Indiana. Pp.
V-XLI + 1-461.)
This is not just another law book. Dean Gavit, in his inimitable style and
his precise and careful method, has accomplished for the lawyers of Indiana
a monumental task.
Hundreds of authorities in both Indiana and other -states have been read,
digested and classified. The statutes of this state relating to the subject matter have been analyzed and commented upon. Not only have the Indiana
statutes been dealt with in such wise but also the New York statutes have
had similar treatment, the Indiana law of the subject matter having followed
very closely the statutory and case law of the older state.
Any lawyer of this jurisdiction who has to do with titles to real estate will
find Dean Gavit's book indispensable, and the general practitioner who is
called from time to time to draft wills, or construe them, cannot hope to
have a sufficient understanding of the matter before him unless this book
is at his hand.
The subject of the book is one that gets little attention from the average
lawyer and yet is one that deserves careful understanding. This work points
out how the common law concepts o.f future interests and tenures have, in
many respects, been changed by the statutes of Indiana and by the interpretations of our courts.
The canons of descent set out by the common law no longer obtain here
and it is in Dean Gavit's book that a complete understanding of the Indiana
law of descent may be found. The profession should be indeed grateful to
Dean Gavit for this work.
This reviewer knows of nowhere else one could go to learn the subject
matter of the treatise.
To say what is the most important feature of the book is to say that it is
all important, but this reviewer is particularly impressed by Dean Gavit's
discussion of the Indiana Law of Future Interests and Uses. In addition to
a learned and careful compilation of what courts and legislatures have said
concerning the subject matter, the book contains the applicable statutes of
both New York and Indiana in full, contains digests of Indiana cases on
charitable trusts, and also digests the New York cases on future gifts to
charity prior to 1893.
The work contains suggestions with reference to the drafting of wills
which no lawyer who is called upon to draft a will, no matter how simple, can
afford not to read.
21 Harper, on Torts, Sec. 233,
22 Civil Rights Cases (1883), 109 U. S. 3, 27 L. ed. 835.

